Use of Child Interviews in DCPP Cases


In Family Court, children are often witnesses to matters before the Court.  Children may witness domestic violence between their parents.  They may provide exculpatory information to refute allegations of adultery or neglect.  In such cases, trial Courts usually shy away from placing children on the witness stand in open Court and instead conduct child interviews in the judge’s chambers, where the child’s testimony is critical.  The prevailing view is that method of information testing protects children.

In cases brought by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP, formerly DYFS), the child is the subject of the action.  The child is person alleged to be in need of protection. So, courts go above and beyond — not only to ensure the child is subjected to in-court testimony, but also to avoid any child testimony, including child interviews.  In DCPP cases, children’s hearsay statements of abuse may be admitted into evidence; however, no such statement is sufficient to make a finding of abuse absent corroboration. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).  Despite this broad exception to the hearsay rule, the Court must still find “credible, corroborative evidence” as a precondition to admissibility of the statement.  New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. L.A., 357 N.J.Super. 155, 167 (App.Div.2003).

Anecdotal experience finds that judges in DCPP matters often prefer to admit the child’s statements of abuse in lieu of live testimony.  But what happens when there is no corroboration for the child’s statements, rendering them inadmissible?  The Division may still choose to proceed, in which case the child’s testimony is required.  Trial judges, many of whom were litigators before they were elevated to the bench, are often adept at handling direct examination.

But what about cross examination?  What happens when defense counsel desires to confront a child witness with inconsistent statements?  What happens if the trial judge does not “confront” the child, but rather, gingerly explores the topic with the child?  Is not cross examination the best device we have in an adversarial system for unearthing the truth?  What becomes of that adversarial system when a trial judge refuses to become adversarial with a witness, and hence, defense counsel is deprived of the most effective means of challenging the child’s statements?

What about the element of surprise?  With a witness on the witness stand, defense counsel can confront the witness with pictures, recordings, written statements – anything likely to call into question the witness’s credibility.  A witness’s credibility is always at issue when he or she testifies; therefore, the New Jersey Rules of Evidence contemplate allowing broad latitude to counsel when exploring the witness’s truthfulness.  N.J.R.E. 611(b).  A party may introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to credibility, whether or not that extrinsic evidence bears upon the subject matter of the action. State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 603 (App. Div. 1987). What happens when defense counsel is deprived of the element of surprise, inasmuch as she must present the information to the trial judge (and opposing counsel) in advance, rather than during live testimony?  Certainly, that takes some of the momentum out of the questioning.

There are no easy answers to these questions.  But, raise these questions (and more) when presenting questions to the trial judge to be asked of the witness.  R. 5:8-6 affords counsel the right to pose questions to be asked of the child by the trial judge.  Use the presentment of questions as your opportunity to educate the judge about the inconsistencies.  Just as there are times when attorneys ask marginally appropriate questions of witnesses moreso to elicit a reaction than to obtain the answer to the question – so, too, should counsel use every opportunity to present questions to inform the Court of weaknesses in the Division’s case.

If you or someone you know is involved in a child welfare (DCPP) matter, contact Paragano & Williams, LLC, to schedule a consultation.

When DCPP comes to Family Court


Not every family law case involving DCPP begins with DCPP filing a complaint against a parent. Many times, parents are involved in a dispute, an allegation of child abuse or neglect occurs and the agency becomes involved in investigating, although they have not yet decided to file a complaint. In these instances, it is not uncommon that the Family Court judge hearing the matter will simply order the parties to “cooperate with DCPP”. And by “cooperate”, the court usually means attend evaluations, cooperate in counseling or other “services” and other significant forms of relief that the division would otherwise have to seek by way of a formal complaint and adducing the appropriate proofs at trial.

Most family law practitioners, not wanting to upset the apple cart, simply agree to “cooperate with DCPP”, feeling that this will expedite their client’s return to a normal custody and parenting time arrangement. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.

Many times, the agency becomes involved to investigate, and being given carte blanche by the family court judge, choose to impose upon parents lengthy, overwhelming services that may or may not be necessary. But, since the agency is relieved of its responsibility to file a complaint and prove its case that the services are necessary, by virtue of the family court judge simply directing the parties to “cooperate with DCPP”, the agency can do whatever it wants.

So what has to be done when DCPP is investigating an allegation during the course of family court litigation? The first thing that the practitioner should be mindful of is noting to the court that were DCPP to file a complaint, it would have to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence before services could be ordered by the court. Parents do not lose those statutory protections because DCPP is investigating without need of filing a complaint because a parent has already chosen to do so.

Second, practitioners should be mindful that the division determination that a certain service is necessary does not compel the result that that service must be provided by the state, in lieu of privately obtained services by the parents. So, for instance, if a parent is directed to participate in counseling, nothing prohibits the parent from seeking counseling through his or her private insurance. In fact, doing so often accelerates the creation of a true therapeutic doctor-patient relationship, as the parent is not weary that any and everything stated to this person will be reported back to the agency.

Finally, it is important that attorneys do not allow themselves to be bullied with a misplaced perception by the judge that a parent’s refusing to “cooperate with DCPP” has something to hide or is culpable of child abuse. Attorneys should offer themselves up as a shield for their clients. Let the court know that your client is more than willing to cooperate with the agency, but you are not willing to subject your client to division involvement absent asserting these protections for him or her, out of concern for your ability to advocate and protect their interests down the road.

Do not forget that Superior Court judges were once attorneys themselves. Even if they did not handle child abuse cases in their practice, they understand the concept of a lawyer’s need to protect his or her client. Assert that need to protect to shield your client from any adverse inferences from the failure to “cooperate”.

At the end of the day, your client may still desire to “cooperate” with DCPP. It maybe faster and accelerate reunification and:or resumption of normal parenting. As long as he or she understands the risks associated with this, that decision belongs to the client alone. But it needs to be an informed decision, and that is where parent attorneys are most vital to this process.

If you or someone you know is involved in a family court matter involving DCPP, please contact Paragano & Williams, LLC to schedule a consultation.

Check Out our New Page: When Family Court meets DCPP Court!


This page contains an article published in the New Jersey Family Lawyer by Allison C. Williams, Esq., exploring the many ways that discrepant rules in child welfare matters – those rules applicable when DCPP files a case, verses those rules applicable when a parent, guardian or other concerned person files a case – can dramatically alter the outcome, and not in a manner that promotes child safety consistently across the Family Part.

Child Abuse in New Jersey may soon be redefined


On March 11, 2013, the New Jersey Law Revision Commission issued its draft report and recommendations for changes to the two statutes in New Jersey that govern the law of child abuse and neglect – namely, Title 9 and Title 30. The public comment period is nearing conclusion.

For anyone who is interested in this area of law, it is vital that you review the Commission’s draft report. Many proposed changes will severely impact parental rights and metonymy in child welfare matters. Many of the current protections for parents will be eliminated, particularly a parent’s right to decline services pending resolution of a fact-finding hearing.

In addition, under the new law, only DCPP can file an action using the strictures of Title 9 to allege child abuse and neglect and seek protective orders. Presumably, that right will still be available in Family Court by other means; however, it is concerning that where DCPP investigates and sees no abuse or neglect, parents will lose the right to file a separate Title 9 action. Effectively, DCPP’s view of a family’s circumstances will be elevated beyond question, unless DCPP decides to file a court action.

Allison C. Williams, Esq., Chair of the DCPP subcommittee of the Family Law Executive Committee (FLEC) of the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA), is working with James Colaprico, Esq., Chair of the Child Welfare Section of NJSBA to provide a comprehensive position opposing the most draconian provisions of the revised law, which aims to coalesce Title 9 and Title 30 into one comprehensive statute within Title 9.

For anyone who is interested, you may view the proposed revised law at:

http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/children/t9childabuseandneglectDTR031113.pdf.

If you or someone you know is involved with DYFS/DCPP, and requires legal advice, please contact Paragano & Williams, LLC to schedule a consultation.

No More KLG based upon DCPP Lies … at least Not This One Particular Lie


In a published decision on June 11, 2013, the Appellate Division has explicitly prohibited trial Courts from ratifying the outright FALSE information given to resource parents by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (“DCPP”) (formerly, the Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”)). Specifically, in DYFS v. H.R. & N.B., the Appellate Division remanded to the trial Court the issue of alternatives to TPR (termination of parental rights) because the relative placement repeatedly testified that DCPP had told her in no uncertain terms that Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) was not available for her niece because the child was not 12 years of age.

The Court pointed out that this clearly erroneous 12-year benchmark was NOT included in the KLG statute. Further, once the trial Court became aware of the relatives’ misinformed perception that KLG was not available for a child under age 12, it had a duty to correct the misinformation.

What’s shocking about this decision is NOT the fact that DCPP lied to the resource parents. That happens all the time. Any attorney who does this work is likely familiar with the anecdotal tales of foster parents being told they MUST adopt or the children for whom they provide care will be yanked away by the Division. We hear, routinely, about the “12-year-old-rule” for KLG. No surprises there.

But when, exactly, is someone – ANYONE – going to address the fact that this very powerful government agency routinely lies to families involved with the child welfare system? This case provides evidence that, not only was the 12-year-old-rule offered up as gospel by the caseworker involved with this family, but she learned of it when she attended a foster parent class!

The Division LIE – “the 12-year-old-rule” was a part of its inculcation of foster parents… State-administered training courses premised upon a LIE by the State. And yet, while the Appellate Division correctly remanded the matter to be considered anew by the trial judge because of the patently inaccurate information provided by DCPP to the foster parent, the fact that an appeal was required in order to right this wrong is disturbing.

When, exactly, will trial Courts respond to outright lies by the Division with the same outrage engendered by lies told by litigants? Shouldn’t we, as a society, be able to rely upon the representations of those in power, those entrusted with protecting our most valuable asset – i.e., children? If anything, shouldn’t there be some sanction for the agency, which is already gifted with the benefit of a presumed “high degree of reliability” per the Cope decision?

When members of the defense bar routinely hear of patterns of practice by the Division that contravene statutes, case law, court rules, administrative regulations, AOC policies, court orders and other legal mandates, we must not shy away from unveiling these atrocities for the trial Court’s consideration. Hopefully, armed with the H.R. case, we now have strong precedent to urge trial Courts not to look past the manipulations of this agency.

One can only hope that trial Courts begin to see how rampant the Division’s lies are … and begin to do something about it.