Tag Archives: child protection

DCPP Court: Desperately Seeking Logic


In the world of child protection, judges are often inclined to “err on the side of caution” when faced with requests for parenting time. Almost universally, parents are required to be supervised when the litigation commences. As the case proceeds, that supervision is often lessened to the point of allowing unsupervised time leading into reunification.

But how often do we truly question the necessity for supervision, let alone the parameters of supervision of parenting time? Recently, I observed a court proceeding where a mother was declared not protective of her children because she had allowed her husband, the perpetrator of domestic violence, to return to the home and continue his abuse of her in the presence of the children. This was the classic “failure to protect” case. The domestic violence victim was allowed only supervised parenting time with the children; however, it was allowed to be liberal and reasonable supervised parenting time. Significantly, the judge was emphatic that the mother could spend as much time with the children in that supervised setting as she desired, so long as she did not spend the night.

Of course, this begs the question. What exactly would she “fail to protect” the children from while they are sleeping in their beds at night?! And if someone else is entrusted with the care of the children, isn’t it that person’s responsibility to protect the children?

Similar questions arise in cases where the allegation is excessive corporal punishment. And most times, the parent accused to be excessive in corporal punishment is required to be supervised. Do we ever stop and think that the best court order for such a parent would be to simply bar any corporal punishment pending an outcome of the case? And if supervision is required, could we not protect the children by simply having the supervisor sleep in the same room with the children so that the parent accused of excessive corporal punishment could not have access to them at night?

But let’s take it one step further. Has anyone ever stopped to question the “logic” of having a parent barred from the home at night time under the theory of requiring supervision, where the allegation is excessive corporal punishment? After all, does anyone really think that the accused parent is going to wake up the children in the middle of the night just for the fun of beating the children? Really?!

Must we assume that every parent accused of poor judgment in parenting requires line of site supervision at all times? It appears the general consensus is that we must in order to be most protective of the children. However, if we consider the overwhelming intrusion into family life and unfortunate impingement upon parental autonomy where supervision is routinely imposed, perhaps we will broaden our perspective on these cases and seek an appropriate compromise that will both ensure child protection and constitutional parental rights.

If you believe the judge in your case is being unduly restrictive as to your parenting time, feel free to contact us to schedule a consultation.

Neglect Findings by DYFS/DCPP must be made on Science – not Assumption


On Monday, September 10, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in a case of significance to all involved in the child welfare system. In DYFS (n/k/a/ DCPP) v. A.L., the trial Court, and subsequently, the Appellate Division, made a finding of neglect against a mother who ingested cocaine during her pregnancy. The finding has wide-ranging implications.

Certainly, no one disputes that ingestion of cocaine may have serious consequences for an unborn fetus – but no less serious than ingestion of cigarette smoke, failure to wear seatbelts, and other less than laudable conduct during pregnancy. The difference with cocaine, however, is that its very mention suggests a moral culpability, which does not attend to other conduct of mothers-to-be.

What may surprise many who do not dwell in the land of child protection is that there is little science to support the conclusion that in utero ingestion of cocaine, per se, is harmful to a fetus. Opponents of the trial court’s conclusion argue that attaching the severe consequence of a substantiation and loss of a child to the unfortunate conduct attendant to addiction will, in all likelihood, deter pregnant addicts from seeking treatment.

And, by thwarting treatment, the child protection community is, once again, creating a “cure” that is worse than the “ailment”. Better alternatives to treatment of addiction must be pursued by our society. It will be interesting to see how our Supreme Court views this critical issue.

To watch the Supreme Court argument, check out the live webcast at 10:00 a.m.:

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/webcast/index.htm

When are DYFS services considered “reasonable”?


“Reasonableness” is imbued in our child protection laws. The agency must exercise “reasonable” efforts to avoid out of home placement. If the child is removed, the agency must provide “reasonable” services to achieve the goal of reunification. The “reasonableness” of those services is a condition precedent to termination of parental rights.

And yet, New Jersey case law is bereft of any true explication of what is considered “reasonable” for services rendered in the name of child protection. For instance, is your run-of-the-mill parenting class a “reasonable” service for the parent of a mentally disturbed, highly medicated “toxic terror” of a child with severe behavioral problems? Is “counseling” a “reasonable” service to address deep-seated psychological issues dating back to childhood, when such counseling is offered by an LCSW and not a psychologist?

And what about court-ordered services? If the division offers some services, but fails to comply with a court order providing for other services, can the totality of services rendered be deemed “reasonable”? And what about when mental health professionals that provide the court-ordered services sought by the division come up with the wrong diagnosis? New Jersey case law does not require the division to succeed in remedying the problems in a family with the services offered; however, in evaluating the “reasonableness” of those services, can a court legitimately find that a service that led a parent down the wrong path by mis-diagnosing a mental health disorder and requiring compliance with treatment of the wrong problem was, in fact, “reasonable” simply because it was sought and paid for by DYFS?

All too often, defense attorneys fail to make a probing inquiry into the appropriateness of the services sought by the division. Earlier this year, the Appellate Division decided T.S., which cautioned trial courts against surreptitiously ordering the “usual services” simply because they are the services usually ordered. Inherent in that Appellate Division ruling is an acknowledgment that over-servicing a family is not reasonable.

But aside from the sheer volume of the repetitive services offered in these cases, the issue of “reasonableness” remains an underutilized area of parental defense in these cases. When addressing the many requests made of parents in these cases, defense counsel should be ever mindful of the common sense, or lack thereof, of what is being requested.

Simply put, when baby has a wet diaper, the solution is not to give her a bottle. Similarly, when dad has an alcohol problem, the solution is not to stick him in a parenting class.

If the question being asked is, “Which came first, the chicken or the baseball,” perhaps we should be questioning the “reasonableness” of the question (i.e., the Division’s services), and not the “reasonableness” of the parent’s inability to answer a ridiculous question.

Can I sue DYFS?


Parents often wonder if they can file a lawsuit against the Department of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP), formerly known as the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). A simple Google search will locate many websites devoted to the goal of “suing DYFS”. Does this really happen? How often? And, who is the prevailing plaintiff when battling the state of New Jersey over its flawed child protection agency?

Unfortunately, only in very limited circumstances can a parent sue DYFS for its often ill-conceived interference in family life. DYFS caseworkers are afforded immunity when performing work in their official capacity as employees of the state. Only when conduct is performed outside the scope of their broad-ranging job duties, or when action is taken that can be considered tortious, may an employee be subject to civil penalties.

Unfortunately, much bad behavior is tolerable when acting under the guise of “child protection”. Perhaps this is because our society feels a moral imperative to protect those who cannot protect themselves. But, does state interference truly prevent and/or remediate harm to children? Or is it more often the case that state involvement causes more harm than good?

To be certain, many families require state assistance in order to function minimally and to preserve their families. However, the vast overreaching of many caseworkers and investigators call into question the legitimacy of those well intentioned, dedicated social workers who are truly desirous of preventing out-of-home placement and keeping families together through the provision of services and proper case management.

As is often the case, it may be that the only way to effectuate change in the system is to initiate litigation and bring the problems to the forefront. Only when we begin to see the evisceration of families as a societal problem, and not just a poor person’s problem, will families in New Jersey truly be safe from obtrusive government intervention.

Abuse and Neglect: Do we have the correct “Burden” of Proof?


On July 20, 2012, the Appellate Division affirmed a trial court finding of abuse and neglect in a case where a father handled a three-month-old baby so roughly as to break his collarbone and cause various fractures. (DYFS v. J.F.) At the end of the decision, the court held that the “preponderance” standard is the appropriate standard for a abuse and neglect matters. But is it?

The rationale for using our judicial system’s lowest burden of proof in abuse and neglect matters is to err on the side of caution where protection of children is at issue. Yet, in DYFS v. J.Y., our court recognized the severe impingement upon family life resulting from a finding of abuse and neglect. Where parental rights are at stake, shouldn’t our judicial system require proof of abuse or neglect by a clear and convincing standard?

The J.F. court thought the lowest burden of proof was appropriate because of the subject matter – i.e., protecting children. After all, the preponderance standard, i.e., the “more likely than not”/50.1 % rule, is most likely to result in false positives. But we bear that risk in the name of “protecting children”. The court found it more protective of children to have Child abuse over-diagnosed then under-diagnosed. Yet, by the time the court system gets to a fact-finding hearing where the ultimate issue of abuse or neglect is determined, the children have already been “protected” by DYFS intrusion for the better part of a year! In fact, in J.F., by the time the case involving sophisticated medical science (rib fractures) was presented at trial, the parents had already completed all services DYFS requested and were immediately reunified with the children, even after the court found the children “abused” at trial.

In this circumstance, can one really suggest that the banging of the gavel and declaration of the children as being “abused” truly offered protection? Or, was the true “protection” in the court’s initial assumption that DYFS was correct, as is done at the initial filing, whether DYFS ultimately proves its case or not?

The J.F. case evidences the fallacy of our child welfare system – i.e., that branding parents as having committed an act of abuse or neglect and sticking the parent’s name on the DCF registry somehow “protects” children.

Yet, at the end of day, it is still the division’s imperative to assign parents the label of child abusers and stick their name on this registry, file litigation immediately severing or severely restricting parental access, for months on end, leaving parents to eventually fight the good fight all in the name of “child protection”. But does giving the parents that label do anything other then demonize often accidental behavior, under the guise of “child protection”? This fallacy undergirds many Appellate Division decisions reversing findings of abuse or neglect where the sole “benefit” of having the finding is “protecting” children who were long-ago return to their parents before a trial ever occurs.

Is this fallacy of child protection really how we want our child welfare system to operate?