Tag Archives: Court

Use of Child Interviews in DCPP Cases


In Family Court, children are often witnesses to matters before the Court.  Children may witness domestic violence between their parents.  They may provide exculpatory information to refute allegations of adultery or neglect.  In such cases, trial Courts usually shy away from placing children on the witness stand in open Court and instead conduct child interviews in the judge’s chambers, where the child’s testimony is critical.  The prevailing view is that method of information testing protects children.

In cases brought by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP, formerly DYFS), the child is the subject of the action.  The child is person alleged to be in need of protection. So, courts go above and beyond — not only to ensure the child is subjected to in-court testimony, but also to avoid any child testimony, including child interviews.  In DCPP cases, children’s hearsay statements of abuse may be admitted into evidence; however, no such statement is sufficient to make a finding of abuse absent corroboration. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).  Despite this broad exception to the hearsay rule, the Court must still find “credible, corroborative evidence” as a precondition to admissibility of the statement.  New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. L.A., 357 N.J.Super. 155, 167 (App.Div.2003).

Anecdotal experience finds that judges in DCPP matters often prefer to admit the child’s statements of abuse in lieu of live testimony.  But what happens when there is no corroboration for the child’s statements, rendering them inadmissible?  The Division may still choose to proceed, in which case the child’s testimony is required.  Trial judges, many of whom were litigators before they were elevated to the bench, are often adept at handling direct examination.

But what about cross examination?  What happens when defense counsel desires to confront a child witness with inconsistent statements?  What happens if the trial judge does not “confront” the child, but rather, gingerly explores the topic with the child?  Is not cross examination the best device we have in an adversarial system for unearthing the truth?  What becomes of that adversarial system when a trial judge refuses to become adversarial with a witness, and hence, defense counsel is deprived of the most effective means of challenging the child’s statements?

What about the element of surprise?  With a witness on the witness stand, defense counsel can confront the witness with pictures, recordings, written statements – anything likely to call into question the witness’s credibility.  A witness’s credibility is always at issue when he or she testifies; therefore, the New Jersey Rules of Evidence contemplate allowing broad latitude to counsel when exploring the witness’s truthfulness.  N.J.R.E. 611(b).  A party may introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to credibility, whether or not that extrinsic evidence bears upon the subject matter of the action. State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 603 (App. Div. 1987). What happens when defense counsel is deprived of the element of surprise, inasmuch as she must present the information to the trial judge (and opposing counsel) in advance, rather than during live testimony?  Certainly, that takes some of the momentum out of the questioning.

There are no easy answers to these questions.  But, raise these questions (and more) when presenting questions to the trial judge to be asked of the witness.  R. 5:8-6 affords counsel the right to pose questions to be asked of the child by the trial judge.  Use the presentment of questions as your opportunity to educate the judge about the inconsistencies.  Just as there are times when attorneys ask marginally appropriate questions of witnesses moreso to elicit a reaction than to obtain the answer to the question – so, too, should counsel use every opportunity to present questions to inform the Court of weaknesses in the Division’s case.

If you or someone you know is involved in a child welfare (DCPP) matter, contact Paragano & Williams, LLC, to schedule a consultation.

What a difference a year makes!


In litigation brought by the division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP)(formerly the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)), one year is a very significant benchmark in the case. After one year in litigation, the court is required to conduct a permanency hearing and to approve a plan to achieve permanency for the child. That plan may include reunification with the parent, termination of parental rights followed by adoption, kinship legal guardianship with a relative, or one of three other alternatives. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.50.

Though there is no statutory requirement for litigation to last one year, anecdotal experience from child welfare attorneys supports that this is typical. Various, however, a requirement for a permanency hearing within one year pursuant to the a
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).

Further, parent educational materials distributed in child welfare courts, provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), that the case should be resolved with reunification, if possible, within one year.

But should we accept the de facto presumption that the litigation must last a year? Does having a one-year “benchmark” allow the agency to justify its delay in implementing necessary services to achieve reunification? Does having a one-year benchmark encourage the agency to talk on additional requested services for family over the course of that year, knowing that the practice typically includes a one-year period of litigation? And because it is exceedingly rare that a court will not grant the agency its request for additional services, what is lost, really, by requesting more and more and more of a parent because the agency has one year to play with?

It is a dirty little secret of child welfare agencies that services are often provided to families solely for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirement down the line to terminate parental rights. Now that ASFA requires concurrent planning, the agency cannot take this “over servicing” approach with only those families anticipated to have termination in their future; it adopts this approach for all families.

The consequence of this “standard operating procedure” is that many families are simply tortured by a one-year entitlement by the agency to control its life, rather than a strategic, directed approach to help families and end litigation. It is true that many families achieve reunification before the end of litigation, as a parent may seek return of the child at any time, which shall be granted unless there is evidence of harm to the child’s health, safety or welfare. See, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.32(a). Yet, it is all too common that the division successfully opposes reunification upon the stated concern that a lapse of perfection upon reunification will only result in a subsequent removal.

This concern is not totally unwarranted. However, the one year benchmark is far too often used as a guillotine over families, rather than a tempered response to the circumstances presented to the court. Wow the benchmark appears to be here to stay, we should not accept that one year is a magic number that should guide most cases. Each case requires and deserves a case-by-case individual approach.

If you or someone you know is involved in child welfare litigation that appears to be dragging on needlessly, contact Paragano & Williams, LLC for assistance resolving your matter expeditiously.

DYFS v. M.P.: Imperfect Parenting as Child Abuse or Neglect?


In the recent unpublished decision of DYFS v. M.P. & D.C., the Appellate Division reversed a trial Court’s finding of abuse and neglect against a mother, determining the ruling was insufficient as a matter of law. Albeit in relatively innocuous prose, the Appellate panel appeared cognizant of the inclination of some lower Courts to adjudicate imperfect parenting as abuse and neglect. For instance, in this case, the mother and 2 kids were staying in a trailer/camper while visiting relatives in New Jersey. The trial Court found the camper “inadequate” – “a fact that would support the unlikely conclusion that every child on a camping trip with a parent or guardian is abused or neglected”.

This powerful dicta raises an important issue for consideration. How many times are parents found to have abused or neglected a child, when all the parent really did was live a less-than-perfect existence? How often do Courts truly require “willful and wanton misconduct” by a parent, with an attendant negative consequence for a child – either harm or substantial risk of harm – before the parent is branded with the lifetime label of abuser? Defense counsel must be mindful to reiterate these standards in EVERY case to ensure that “imperfection of parenting” does not transmute into the “imperviousness of labeling” parents.

DYFS Substantiations of Child Abuse – The Role of Corroboration


In DYFS v. T.L. A-0506-11T2, the Appellate Division entered several rulings about corroboration of children’s statements of prior abuse. The Court noted that N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4) exists to alleviate the necessity of having children unnecessarily relive unpleasant experiences by being required to testify when other reliable evidence will suffice to prove the truth of the matter.  One such piece of “reliable evidence” is the Admission of the parent. 

But interestingly, the Court also held that prior statements of “the child” need not be limited to “the child” at issue in the litigation.  Prior statements of non-subject children can also be admitted.  This ruling seems at variance with the plain language of the statute, which references “the” child – not “a” child.  However, the statute is designed to prevent abuse victims from testifying.  In this case, all children at issue – even those who were not subject to the action – were victimized by the conduct about which statements were given.  Hence, the result achieved by the ruling is consonant with the purpose of the statute.

But what if the non-subject children could only speak to the alleged victimization of “the child” at issue in the case?  In this scenario, I am not so sure that the Court’s ruling in T.L. would stand.  Future published appellate cases may give some guidance on this issue, as there is none at present.