What is a Dodd Removal?


When DCPP, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (formerly, DYFS, the Division of Youth and Family Services) investigates an allegation of child abuse or neglect, and uncovers what it believes to be “imminent risk of harm”, the Division may remove the children from the home immediately without a court order. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.28. This removal is referred to as a “Dodd” removal, named after the legislator who sponsored the legislation giving the Division this right. Once a Dodd removal occurs, the Division must be before a judge seeking a court order ratifying the Dodd within two court days.

What constitutes “imminent risk of harm”? That varies from county to county, and frankly, from investigator to investigator. However, some general parameters include child sexual abuse where the alleged perpetrator is in the home; physical child abuse that would rise to the level of an “aggravating circumstance” that would relieve the Division of its obligation to make reasonable efforts to avoid placement; abandonment (i.e., child in the home with no caregiver), or acts of a similarly serious nature.

Unfortunately, the Division will, from time to time, act improvidently in removing children from their home. This may occur in circumstances where the parent has been voluntarily accepting services from the Division over a period of time, and the agency ultimately comes to the conclusion that it is tired of trying to work with the parents and feels court intervention must be imposed upon the family to effectuate the positive result sought.

It is also not unheard of that the agency will threaten to do a Dodd removal in order to scare parents into signing contracts with the agency, allowing unfettered access to a home, signing releases for medical or mental health information that is otherwise protected, and similar overreaching to accomplish what they otherwise could not.

Many times, parents will contact counsel after the fact and claim that they only signed agreements and authorized the release of confidential information upon threat of removal by the Division. Such tactics constitute a gross violation of the public trust and misuse of government authority. Unfortunately, my experience has been that judges are upset by improvident removals than by noncooperation by parents when the Division investigates. Therefore, one must not casually disregard the Division’s threats to remove children, even when the parent believes the agency could not ultimately prove “imminent risk of harm” in court.

If you or someone you know has been contacted by the Division seeking to investigate, before denying access and facing potential removal, contact Paragano and Williams, LLC for a consultation.

DCPP Court: Desperately Seeking Logic


In the world of child protection, judges are often inclined to “err on the side of caution” when faced with requests for parenting time. Almost universally, parents are required to be supervised when the litigation commences. As the case proceeds, that supervision is often lessened to the point of allowing unsupervised time leading into reunification.

But how often do we truly question the necessity for supervision, let alone the parameters of supervision of parenting time? Recently, I observed a court proceeding where a mother was declared not protective of her children because she had allowed her husband, the perpetrator of domestic violence, to return to the home and continue his abuse of her in the presence of the children. This was the classic “failure to protect” case. The domestic violence victim was allowed only supervised parenting time with the children; however, it was allowed to be liberal and reasonable supervised parenting time. Significantly, the judge was emphatic that the mother could spend as much time with the children in that supervised setting as she desired, so long as she did not spend the night.

Of course, this begs the question. What exactly would she “fail to protect” the children from while they are sleeping in their beds at night?! And if someone else is entrusted with the care of the children, isn’t it that person’s responsibility to protect the children?

Similar questions arise in cases where the allegation is excessive corporal punishment. And most times, the parent accused to be excessive in corporal punishment is required to be supervised. Do we ever stop and think that the best court order for such a parent would be to simply bar any corporal punishment pending an outcome of the case? And if supervision is required, could we not protect the children by simply having the supervisor sleep in the same room with the children so that the parent accused of excessive corporal punishment could not have access to them at night?

But let’s take it one step further. Has anyone ever stopped to question the “logic” of having a parent barred from the home at night time under the theory of requiring supervision, where the allegation is excessive corporal punishment? After all, does anyone really think that the accused parent is going to wake up the children in the middle of the night just for the fun of beating the children? Really?!

Must we assume that every parent accused of poor judgment in parenting requires line of site supervision at all times? It appears the general consensus is that we must in order to be most protective of the children. However, if we consider the overwhelming intrusion into family life and unfortunate impingement upon parental autonomy where supervision is routinely imposed, perhaps we will broaden our perspective on these cases and seek an appropriate compromise that will both ensure child protection and constitutional parental rights.

If you believe the judge in your case is being unduly restrictive as to your parenting time, feel free to contact us to schedule a consultation.