Tag Archives: Services

Child Abuse in New Jersey may soon be redefined


On March 11, 2013, the New Jersey Law Revision Commission issued its draft report and recommendations for changes to the two statutes in New Jersey that govern the law of child abuse and neglect – namely, Title 9 and Title 30. The public comment period is nearing conclusion.

For anyone who is interested in this area of law, it is vital that you review the Commission’s draft report. Many proposed changes will severely impact parental rights and metonymy in child welfare matters. Many of the current protections for parents will be eliminated, particularly a parent’s right to decline services pending resolution of a fact-finding hearing.

In addition, under the new law, only DCPP can file an action using the strictures of Title 9 to allege child abuse and neglect and seek protective orders. Presumably, that right will still be available in Family Court by other means; however, it is concerning that where DCPP investigates and sees no abuse or neglect, parents will lose the right to file a separate Title 9 action. Effectively, DCPP’s view of a family’s circumstances will be elevated beyond question, unless DCPP decides to file a court action.

Allison C. Williams, Esq., Chair of the DCPP subcommittee of the Family Law Executive Committee (FLEC) of the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA), is working with James Colaprico, Esq., Chair of the Child Welfare Section of NJSBA to provide a comprehensive position opposing the most draconian provisions of the revised law, which aims to coalesce Title 9 and Title 30 into one comprehensive statute within Title 9.

For anyone who is interested, you may view the proposed revised law at:

http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/children/t9childabuseandneglectDTR031113.pdf.

If you or someone you know is involved with DYFS/DCPP, and requires legal advice, please contact Paragano & Williams, LLC to schedule a consultation.

What a difference a year makes!


In litigation brought by the division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP)(formerly the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)), one year is a very significant benchmark in the case. After one year in litigation, the court is required to conduct a permanency hearing and to approve a plan to achieve permanency for the child. That plan may include reunification with the parent, termination of parental rights followed by adoption, kinship legal guardianship with a relative, or one of three other alternatives. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.50.

Though there is no statutory requirement for litigation to last one year, anecdotal experience from child welfare attorneys supports that this is typical. Various, however, a requirement for a permanency hearing within one year pursuant to the a
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).

Further, parent educational materials distributed in child welfare courts, provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), that the case should be resolved with reunification, if possible, within one year.

But should we accept the de facto presumption that the litigation must last a year? Does having a one-year “benchmark” allow the agency to justify its delay in implementing necessary services to achieve reunification? Does having a one-year benchmark encourage the agency to talk on additional requested services for family over the course of that year, knowing that the practice typically includes a one-year period of litigation? And because it is exceedingly rare that a court will not grant the agency its request for additional services, what is lost, really, by requesting more and more and more of a parent because the agency has one year to play with?

It is a dirty little secret of child welfare agencies that services are often provided to families solely for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirement down the line to terminate parental rights. Now that ASFA requires concurrent planning, the agency cannot take this “over servicing” approach with only those families anticipated to have termination in their future; it adopts this approach for all families.

The consequence of this “standard operating procedure” is that many families are simply tortured by a one-year entitlement by the agency to control its life, rather than a strategic, directed approach to help families and end litigation. It is true that many families achieve reunification before the end of litigation, as a parent may seek return of the child at any time, which shall be granted unless there is evidence of harm to the child’s health, safety or welfare. See, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.32(a). Yet, it is all too common that the division successfully opposes reunification upon the stated concern that a lapse of perfection upon reunification will only result in a subsequent removal.

This concern is not totally unwarranted. However, the one year benchmark is far too often used as a guillotine over families, rather than a tempered response to the circumstances presented to the court. Wow the benchmark appears to be here to stay, we should not accept that one year is a magic number that should guide most cases. Each case requires and deserves a case-by-case individual approach.

If you or someone you know is involved in child welfare litigation that appears to be dragging on needlessly, contact Paragano & Williams, LLC for assistance resolving your matter expeditiously.

DYFS Cases name both Parents as Defendants


Parents often ask me why the non-offending parent is listed as a defendant when the State of New Jersey, vis-à-vis the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP), formerly known as the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), files a lawsuit in court. The answer is simple. Because the state is seeking relief against the parents, whether that parent has done anything wrong or not.

Usually, in these cases the division is looking for the court to order the parents to call operate with services for the child who has been allegedly abused or neglected. Both parents have a right to be heard and to oppose any such relief as to their child.

Of course, this raises an important irony. When the court has jurisdiction over the child, which occurs as soon as the division files an action, services are routinely ordered for the child. This may include evaluations, therapy, mentors, school assistance, Financial assistance, etc. If a parent were inclined to oppose such “services”, what would be the end result? With rare exception, the parent’s opposition would be noted, but not honored, and services would be ordered in any event.

We do have the recent case of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services vs. T.S., Which cautions the trial court against ordering services simply because they are “routinely ordered”; However, those services are related to the parent – not the child.

In reality, the state wants the parent to participate in the litigation – whether they are the cause of it or not – as they will be required to implement any services for the child, Including, for instance, transporting the child to therapy, assisting the child with any tutoring or mentoring that is provided for the child, giving background information to any professionals performing evaluations, etc. And, if nothing else, the non-offending parent will want to know what is being alleged as to his/her child.

Non-offending parents should use their participation in the litigation for its intended purpose of facilitating a resolution of issues impacting the child. For any litigation that follows the child welfare case, the parent will then be armed with information about the welfare of the child that may bare upon issues of custody, parenting time, and related issues.

Heightened Burden to Terminate Parental Rights of a Teen Parent


The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division has provided trial Courts with guidance vis-a-vis an analytical framework to evaluate the State’s efforts to terminate the parental rights of a teen parent. In the New Jersey Div. of Youth and Fam. Svcs. v. L.J.D., the Court established a “heightened burden” for guardianship matters involving teens. This “special circumstance” of teen parenthood requires “services to aid the development of the child-parent’s maturation” and likely necessitates extending reunification efforts beyond the twelve-month timeframe mandated by N.J.S.A. 30:4D-61.2(a) and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54(b). These are important guideposts to evaluate future TPR cases involving teen parents.

This 55-page Decision, authored by Judge Lihotz, raises many questions, not the least of which is the appropriateness of “services” offered by the agency to parents from whom children have been removed. In this case, the parent argued that services were not appropriate because the Division did not provide one last service – a Mommy & Me program – that may have been sufficient. The Court rejected this argument – not based upon the program proposed, but based upon the volume of “services” that otherwise were not utilized effectively by the parent.

This demonstrates the need for parent-advocates to oppose the routine referrals made for services when those services are not likely to benefit the parent and child. Services should not be rejected out of hand; however, if the only conceivable benefit to a parent in a particular service is to aid the Division is increasing its list of “services” offered to meet its “reasonable efforts” mandate, the service should be opposed.

Each offered “service” should be evaluated. Ask for Resumes of Service Providers. Request detailed information about the program guidelines. If the program is geared toward substance abuse, and the parent’s primary issue is psychological disorder, oppose this service being required of the parent. Or, at the very least, oppose the service being included in the list of the Division’s “reasonable efforts” to reunify. In all litigation, cases are won and lost on the details. Child welfare cases are no different. Make your record in these cases by holding the Division to its burden – whether it be the “usual” burden or the heightened burden of L.J.D.

When are DYFS services considered “reasonable”?


“Reasonableness” is imbued in our child protection laws. The agency must exercise “reasonable” efforts to avoid out of home placement. If the child is removed, the agency must provide “reasonable” services to achieve the goal of reunification. The “reasonableness” of those services is a condition precedent to termination of parental rights.

And yet, New Jersey case law is bereft of any true explication of what is considered “reasonable” for services rendered in the name of child protection. For instance, is your run-of-the-mill parenting class a “reasonable” service for the parent of a mentally disturbed, highly medicated “toxic terror” of a child with severe behavioral problems? Is “counseling” a “reasonable” service to address deep-seated psychological issues dating back to childhood, when such counseling is offered by an LCSW and not a psychologist?

And what about court-ordered services? If the division offers some services, but fails to comply with a court order providing for other services, can the totality of services rendered be deemed “reasonable”? And what about when mental health professionals that provide the court-ordered services sought by the division come up with the wrong diagnosis? New Jersey case law does not require the division to succeed in remedying the problems in a family with the services offered; however, in evaluating the “reasonableness” of those services, can a court legitimately find that a service that led a parent down the wrong path by mis-diagnosing a mental health disorder and requiring compliance with treatment of the wrong problem was, in fact, “reasonable” simply because it was sought and paid for by DYFS?

All too often, defense attorneys fail to make a probing inquiry into the appropriateness of the services sought by the division. Earlier this year, the Appellate Division decided T.S., which cautioned trial courts against surreptitiously ordering the “usual services” simply because they are the services usually ordered. Inherent in that Appellate Division ruling is an acknowledgment that over-servicing a family is not reasonable.

But aside from the sheer volume of the repetitive services offered in these cases, the issue of “reasonableness” remains an underutilized area of parental defense in these cases. When addressing the many requests made of parents in these cases, defense counsel should be ever mindful of the common sense, or lack thereof, of what is being requested.

Simply put, when baby has a wet diaper, the solution is not to give her a bottle. Similarly, when dad has an alcohol problem, the solution is not to stick him in a parenting class.

If the question being asked is, “Which came first, the chicken or the baseball,” perhaps we should be questioning the “reasonableness” of the question (i.e., the Division’s services), and not the “reasonableness” of the parent’s inability to answer a ridiculous question.

DYFS Request for Services: Treatment or Entrapment


At the inception of every DYFS case, the agency will tell the parent to engage in “services” designed to remediate the condition that led to DYFS involvement. Services cannot be ordered until a court, by way of Stipulation or Fact Finding trial, makes a finding against the parent. However, parents are often urged by the Court and by defense counsel, to submit to services immediately so that, if the parent loses at trial, they will have already completed the services necessary to be reunited with their child.

My advice as to services: “Do not go gently into that good night!” As soon as the parents put themselves into the Division’s service provider’s hands, anything they say can and will be used against them. Normal mental health conditions such as depression and anxiety often are bootstrapped to whatever the initial complaint allegation was, inexorably enlarging the allegations to be countered.

Voluntary submission to services pre-fact finding should be the exception and not the rule.